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1. Introduction
The origins of testing scientific models with statistical techniques go back to 18th
century mathematics. However, the modern theory of statistical testing was primarily
developed through the work of Sir R.A. Fisher, Jerzy Neyman, and Egon Pearson in
the inter-war period. Some of Fisher’s papers on testing were published in economics
journals (Fisher, 1923, 1935) and exerted a notable influence on the discipline. The
development of econometrics and the rise of quantitative economic models in the mid-
20th century made statistical significance testing a commonplace, albeit controversial
tool within economics.
In the debate about significance testing, methodological controversies intertwine
with epistemological issues and sociological developments. Our aim in this chapter
is to expound these connections and to show how the use of, and the debate about,
significance testing in economics differs from other social sciences, such as psychology.
Section 2 explains the basic principles of statistical significance testing with partic-
ular attention to its use in economics. In Section 3, we sketch how significance testing
got entrenched in economics, and we highlight some early criticisms. Section 4 deals
with Ziliak and McCloskey’s criticism that significance tests, and the economists who
apply them, confuse statistical and proper economic significance (i.e., effect size). Sec-
tion 5 relates significance testing to the problem of publication bias in science and
compares the debates about significance testing in economics and psychology. Section
6 wraps up and briefly discusses some suggestions for methodological improvement.
2. Statistical Significance Testing
There are two grand traditions of interpreting statistical testing procedures. Jerzy Ney-
man and Egon Pearson’s behavioral, decision-theoretic approach contrasts two compet-
ing hypotheses, the “null” hypothesis H0 and the “alternative” H1, and conceptualizes
statistical tests as an instrument for controlling the rate of erroneous decisions in re-
jecting or accepting one of them. Although such decision-theroetic formalisms have a
natural affinity to rational choice theory and economic reasoning, econometric testing
generally follows R.A. Fisher’s evidential approach (Fisher, 3574, 1956) based on an
interpretation of low p-values as evidence against the tested hypothesis.
Fisher’s approach shall now be expounded. For Fisher, the purpose of statistical
analysis consists in assessing the relation of a null hypothesis H0 to a body of ob-
served data. That hypothesis usually stands for there being no effect of interest, no
causal relationship between two variables, or simply for a scientific default assump-
tion. For example, suppose we run a simple linear regression model yi = α+ β xi + εi
(with i.i.d.1 error terms εi), where the data points xi and yi are paired realizations of
the quantities of interest X and Y . A possible null hypothesis would be H0 : β = 0,
claiming that there is no systematic relationship between the variables X and Y . Mc-
Closkey and Ziliak (1996, 98) give the example of a regression analysis for purchasing
power, comparing prices of goods abroad to those at home: β = 1 (and α = 0) would
then express perfect match between home prices (X) and abroad prices (Y ), modulo
random error.
Testing such null hypotheses for compatibility with the data is called a null hy-
pothesis significance test (NHST). The alternative hypothesis H1 is typically
unspecific and expresses the presence of an effect that differs from the hypothesized
null effect (e.g., H1 : β 6= 0 if the null is H0 : β = 0). Now, the basic rationale of
significance tests is that results that fall into the extreme tails of the probability dis-
tribution postulated by the null hypothesis H0 compromise its tenability: “either an
exceptionally rare chance has occurred, or the theory [=the null hypothesis] is not
true.” (Fisher, 1956, 39). The occurrence of such an exceptionally rare chance has
both epistemological and practical consequences: first, the null hypothesis is rendered
“objectively incredible” (Spielman, 1974, 214); second, the null should be treated as
if it were false.
Notably, Fisher’s ideas are close to Popper’s falsificationism (Popper, 2002). They
both agree the only purpose of an experiment is to “give the facts a chance of dis-
proving the null hypothesis” (Fisher, 3574, 16). They also agree that failure to reject a
hypothesis does not conclude positive evidence for the tested (null) hypothesis. How-
ever, while Popper gives a negative characterization of scientific knowledge, Fisher
uses statistical tests for a positive account of experimental knowledge: the existence of
causal effects can be demonstrated experimentally by means of (statistically) rejecting
the hypothesis that the observed effect occurred due to chance.
The central concept of modern significance tests—the p-value—is now illustrated
in a two-sided testing problem. Suppose we want to infer whether the mean θ of an
unknown distribution is significantly different from the null value H0 : θ = θ0. We
observe data x := (x1, . . . , xN ), corresponding to N i.i.d. realizations of an experiment
with (unknown) population mean θ and (known) variance σ2. Then, one measures
the discrepancy in the data x with respect to the postulated mean value θ0 using the







i=1 xi − θ0√
N · σ2
(1)
We may re-interpret equation (1) as
z =
observed effect− hypothesized effect
standard error
(2)
The p-value then depends on the probability distribution of z given the null hypothesis:
p := pH0(|z(X)| ≥ |z(x)|), (3)
or in other words, the p-value describes the probability of observing a more extreme
discrepancy under the null than the actually observed one. The lower the p-value,
that is, the more the observed effect diverges from the effect postulated by the null
hypothesis, the less does the null hypothesis explain the data.
Such p-values or “observed significance levels” play a large role in econometrics: they
serve as an indicator of whether a finding is noteworthy, interesting, and ultimately
publishable. Moreover, the conventional classification into various levels of significance
is used for annotating correlation tables and for making them more readable: one as-
terisk behind an entry corresponds to p < .05 (“significant”), two asterisks to p < .01
(“highly significant”), and three asterisks to p < .001 (“very highly significant”). It
is precisely this suggestive annotation practice that has attracted trenchant criticism
in the last decades, since it obliterates the differences between statistical and genuine
scientific significance. Before entering this debate, however, we first review the his-
tory of significance testing in econometrics, and some early debates. Specifically, we
illustrate how the methodological controversies raised by significance testing are philo-
sophically interesting, and that issues in the philosophy of statistics are consequential
for important issues in economics.
3. Early Debates about Significance Testing in Econometrics
3.1. Econometrics and The Tinbergen Debates
We start with an important distinction between economic statistics and economet-
rics. Economic statistics consists of gathering and formulating descriptive statistical
information about economic facts. By contrast, econometrics is the use of inferential
statistics to formulate answers to theoretical questions, such as “Are interest rates
pro-cyclical?” or “Is the fiscal multiplier greater than unity?”
The Tinbergen Debates occurred quite early in the history of econometrics. Jan
Tinbergen was a Dutch economist who had already constructed the first econometric
model of the business cycle in 1936. In a study for the League of Nations, Tinbergen
sought both to popularise his approach to econometric research, to apply it to mod-
elling actual economies, and to test a theory of the business cycle with these data.
His approach to statistics was typical of the spirit of the day: econometrics cannot not
prove economic theories right, but it could prove that a theory is incorrect (Tinber-
gen, 1939, 12). Tinbergen applied a large number of goodness-of-fit tests of statistical
significance to the equations of his models (Morgan, 1990, 108–120). His approach was
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sophisticated, and he might easily have expected a positive reaction from prominent
contemporary business cycle theorists.
He would have been wrong. John Maynard Keynes (1939) scathingly criticised Tin-
bergen’s research and stated that the results of Tinbergen’s statistical work “probably
have no value” (Keynes, 1939, 559). Keynes’s principal objections were that Tinber-
gen’s work failed to meet some requirements that Keynes considered to be vital: (1) full
knowledge of the causally relevant factors; (2) these causal factors must be measurable
and mutually independent; (3) the relationships must be linear; (4) one must know
the relevant time lags and trends. Keynes thought that these conditions were more or
less never met in economics, so he saw practically no role for significance testing by
econometricians. This criticism led to a brief series of exchanges between Tinbergen
(1940a,b)2, and Keynes (1940), with other economists joining. Mary S. Morgan (1990,
123–124) argues that an underlying epistemological issue in the Tinbergen Debates was
a disagreement between Tinbergen and Keynes on the potential function of statistical
testing: for Keynes, its only possible role was to identify the strength of factors within
a causal framework that had already been developed by theoretical analysis; for Tin-
bergen, statistical testing could also inform—though not determine—the theoretical
analysis. This antagonism resurfaces in later critiques of significance testing by Ziliak
and McCloskey.
There were other methodological debates that arose out of Tinbergen’s work in the
late 1930s (e.g., Haavelmo, 1940). For instance, in a 1940 letter, Oskar Lange argued
that Tinbergen’s results lacked “statistical significance” because he had failed to take
serial correlation (i.e., autocorrelation, a positive or negative association between a
variable and its future/past values) into account and serial correlation is exactly one
of the reasons why we want a business cycle model in the first place. Hence, Lange
thought that Tinbergen’s methods were either flawed or redundant (Louçã, 2007; Or-
cutt and Irwin, 1948). This criticism illustrates how some economists in the 1940s used
“statistical significance” to refer to an epistemic achievement, rather than its contem-
porary sense of controlling error rates or p-values below a certain level (typically 0.05).
Another example was the reaction of a young Milton Friedman:
Tinbergen’s results cannot be judged by ordinary tests of statistical significance. The
reason is that the variables with which he winds up, the particular series measuring
these variables, the leads and lags, and various other aspects of the equations besides the
particular values of the parameters (which alone can be tested by the usual statistical
technique) have been selected after an extensive process of trial and error because they
yield high coefficients of correlation [with that sample data]. (Friedman, 1940, 659)
Here, Friedman is contending that statistical significance tests of an economic model
are only appropriate if they are out-of-sample tests3 Unlike Keynes, Friedman thought
that significance testing had a potential function within theory choice. However, he
regarded work like Tinbergen’s as only useful for identifying whether models are worth
testing further, with more data (Friedman, 1940, p.660). In Hans Reichenbach’s ter-
minology, Friedman saw in-sample testing as limited to the “context of discovery”,
where we develop economic theories, and not the “context of justification” where we
evaluate theories on the basis on their theoretical and empirical merits (Reichenbach,
1938). The methodological value of out-of-sample testing continues to be debated in
2Anticipating some later comments about statistical significance and economic significance, Tinbergen (1940b,
143–145) distinguishes between “statistical independence”—the absence of a correlation between variables—
and “economic independence”—a type of causal independence.
3That is, the models are not tested with the same data used to estimate their parameters.
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economics (e.g., Gelfond and Murphy, 2016).
3.2. The “Con” in Econometrics
Economists were always somewhat sceptical of post-war econometrics. However, the
end of post-war economic stability in the 1970s and poor performance of economet-
ric models during that decade encouraged intense methodological reflections (Hayek,
1989; Hendry, 1980; Lucas, 1976; Sims, 1980). One of the most important was Edward
Leamer’s “Let’s Take the Con Out of Econometrics” (Leamer, 1983). Leamer covers
many methodological issues, but his general critique is that significance testing in
econometrics normally involves a large number of often unrealistic assumptions, e.g.
that the model’s error terms are uncorrelated. Due to the influential instrumentalist
manifesto of Milton Friedman (1953), economists are generally comfortable with unre-
alistic assumptions. However, if the data are relevant to the model only in conjunction
with unrealistic assumptions, then these assumptions cannot be regarded any more as
useful idealizations, and be used as such in statistical testing. Leamer grants that the
assumptions may be approximately true, but the results of the test then depend on
their exact details. Therefore, Leamer recommends (and helped develop) sensitivity
analysis: given that economic theory or background knowledge cannot uniquely specify
the statistical assumptions to make in our tests, we should report the consequences of
adopting various assumptions. This will help identify test results that are very sensi-
tive to particular assumptions, and increase the robustness of our statistical practices.
Although Leamer’s paper has been cited thousands of times, he is unimpressed by
subsequent efforts towards more robust significance testing in econometrics (Leamer,
2010).
Leamer also advocates a Subjective Bayesian methodology over the (alleged) ob-
jectivity of classical significance testing. One of his reasons is that even sophisticated
econometric models can easily be tested using modern computers. This makes some
types of statistical malpractice much easier (Leamer, 1983, 36–37). Before the 1970s,
testing complex econometric models was extraordinarily difficult or even impossible.
This changed in the early 1970s, transforming econometric practice. While this trans-
formation was useful in many ways, it also created methodological hazards, as Leamer
noted: computational limitations had been a partial shield against p-hacking, that is,
the use of questionable research practices (e.g., selective reporting of studies, removing
outliers, adding further covariates, etc.) in order to obtain a statistically significant
result (i.e., p < .05). In a context where a test could take weeks or months, even with
the aid of computers, statistically significant results were genuinely surprising and
systematic p-hacking was not feasible. Modern computers can carry out analogous
tests in seconds, so statistically significant results are less surprising for economists.
There is also some empirical evidence of p-hacking in economics (Brodeur et al., 2016).
Strategies to counteract this danger are discussed in Section 5.
4. The Cult of Statistical Significance? Effect size vs. p-values
Another forceful criticism of significance tests concerns their relation to effect size,
and the confusion between p-values and proper effect size measures. The economists
Deirdre McCloskey and Stephen Ziliak (henceforth, ZMC) have made this point in
a series of papers and books (McCloskey and Ziliak, 1996; Ziliak and McCloskey,
2004, 2008). We illustrate the difference with one of their favorite examples (Ziliak
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and McCloskey, 2008, ch. 1). Assume that we have to choose between two diet cures,
based on pill A and pill B. Pill A makes us lose 10 pounds on average, with an average
variation of 5 pounds.4 Pill B makes us lose 3 pounds on average, with an average
variation of 1 pound. Which one leads to more significant loss? Naturally, we opt for
pill A because the effect of the cure is so much larger.
However, if we translate the example back into significance testing, the order is
reversed. Assume the standard deviations are known for either pill. Compared to the
null hypothesis of no effect at all, observing a three pounds weight loss after taking
pill B is a more significant result evidence for the efficacy of that cure than observing








Thus, there is a notable discrepancy between our intuitive judgment and the one sug-
gested by the p-values. This occurs because statistical significance is supposed to be
“a measure of the strength of the signal relative to background noise” (Hoover and
Siegler, 2008, 58). On this score, pill B indeed performs better than pill A. According
to Ziliak and McCloskey, however, economists and policy-makers are primarily inter-
ested in the effect size, not the signal/noise ratio: they do not want to ascertain the
presence of some effect, but to demonstrate a substantial effect. Due to the importance
of the latter for practical decisions and economic policy—Ziliak and McCloskey call
this “policy oomph”— we should actually focus on practically meaningful effect sizes
rather than significance levels. The former can be measured by standardized regression
coefficients, or specific statistics such as Cohen’s d or Pearson’s r2 (for the strength
of correlations), but not by p-values. An effect need not be statistically significant to
be big and remarkable (like pill A), and a statistically significant effect can be quite
small and uninteresting (like pill B).
This fundamental difference is, however, frequently neglected: in practice, the level
of significance acts often as a cue to scientific importance (compare Cohen, 1994, for a
similar diagnosis in psychology). By scrutinizing the statistical practice in the top jour-
nal American Economic Review, as well as by surveying the opinion of economists on
the meaning of statistical significance, McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) derive the conclu-
sion that statistical concepts and tools are frequently abused. For example, researchers
tend to confound economic with statistical significance (70% of the papers do not make
an explicit distinction), relate effect sizes to the scientific context (72%), or engage in
“sign econometrics”, where the sign, but not the size of a coefficient is commented on
(53%). Worse still, there is no visible improvement over time. According to Ziliak and
McCloskey, the discussion in statistics and methodology journals has done nothing to
little to alleviate the problems since the proportion of articles with questionable use
of significance tests has not decreased over time (Ziliak and McCloskey, 2004, 2008).
In total, ZMC’s critique of significance testing can be summarized as: (1) signifi-
cance tests encourage reasoning fallacies (e.g., statistical significance = null hypothesis
refuted or effect economically meaningful); (2) they are not a suitable tool for economic
analysis (because they do not aim at effect size or “policy oomph”); (3) they give rise
to a culture of mindless use of statistical inference without proper considerations of
economic and policy implications (see also Gigerenzer, 2004). Few statistics or econo-
metric textbooks highlight this difference, and thus prevent the proper appreciation
4The concept of “average variation” is intuitively explicated as the statistical concept of standard deviation,




of the limits of significance tests in upcoming generations.
The echo of Ziliak and McCloskey’s work in the economic community and beyond
was mainly positive, but not exclusively so. For eminent statisticians like Arnold Zell-
ner or methodologists like Nathan Berg (2004), Edward Leamer (2004) and Bruce
Thompson (2004), the critique of (the mindless use of) NHSTs fits into a broader
project of changing and improving scientific method. Even if they don’t all agree
about the right direction for the future, they agree that NHSTs are flawed and need
to be replaced. A second group agrees with ZMC on their central points, but nuance
their criticism. For example, Joel Horowitz (2004) observes that significance testing
with all its problems may well be inevitable when we want to test whether an economic
model is well-specified, or when we are interested in the existence of an effect rather
than its magnitude. Finally, a third group (e.g., Elliott and Granger, 2004; Hoover
and Siegler, 2008) defends NHSTs and argues (1) that testing theories is inevitable;
(2) there is a need for non-subjective method of theory testing and NHSTs provide it;
(3) ZMC’s focus on effect size is not without problems (e.g., it does not adequately
quantify the uncertainty of the estiamte); (4) misuse of procedures is not unique to
NHSTs, but occurs in all parts of statistical reasoning. That latter point is also shared
by Gigerenzer (2004) who warns that shifting to another framework (e.g., Bayesian
reasoning) may just lead to a reiteration of mindless statistical inferences with different
tools.5
5. New Challenges: Publication Bias, the Replication Crisis, and
Comparison with Psychology
The last years have seen an increasing distrust in scientific findings due to concerns
about publication bias and lack of replicability. Publication bias means bias in what
is published with respect to what is researched, and it is related to significance tests
since they often act as a gatekeeper for the whether a finding is “interesting” or
“publishable”. The standard approach to significance tests makes it hard to interpret
non-significant results, and to draw any substantive inference from them. By contrast,
as shown by Ziliak and McCloskey, it is easy to lure oneself into identifying a statisti-
cally significant result with an important scientific finding. While this mechanism of
suppressing non-significant results, called the file drawer effect, and its impact on the
published literature, has been identified long ago in theoretical models (e.g., Ioanni-
dis, 2005; Rosenthal, 1979; Rozeboom, 1960; Sterling, 1959), it has been ignored by
economists for a long time, especially by those not involved in methodological debates.
Recently, the severity of the problem has been demonstrated by systematic replication
projects for experimental findings in psychology, medicine and economics, revealing a
disappointingly low replication rate in all featured disciplines (e.g., Collaboration 2015
for psychology and Camerer et al. 2016 for experimental economics).
The problem is not only that significance tests lead to a depreciation of non-
significant findings (even if they are methodologically sound), but that researchers
often use questionable research methods, such as selective reporting of results, adding
covariates, eliminating outliers, etc., in order to obtain a significant (and therefore pub-
lishable) finding. Such p-hacking is easy to achieve with modern computation tools.
Meta-analytic techniques such as funnel plots and p-curves have provided evidence
5However, surveys of statistical research practice reveal that fallacious interpretations of inference procedures
are particularly frequent for NHSTs as compared to confidence intervals or Bayesian inference (e.g., Cumming,
2012; Fidler, 2005).
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of publication bias in various research areas (Simonsohn et al., 2014; Weiß and Wag-
ner, 2011); the file drawer effect and p-hacking are plausible causes of these findings.
Specifically in economics, Brodeur et al. (2016) have found a two-humped distribution
of p-values, suggesting not only an excess of just significant results, but also that re-
searchers try to “work away” ambiguous significant p-values either toward significance
or toward clear non-significance. Crucially, one need not assume mischievous or badly
trained researchers for explaining such findings—complex data analysis problems re-
quire many judgment calls and researchers may be unconsciously influenced by their
own biases and incentives when making such decisions.
Olken (2015) discusses compulsory preregistration of the data analysis plan (i.e.,
before collecting or analyzing the data) as an antidote to p-hacking and HARKing—
that is, hypothesizing after the results are known, and relabeling exploratory as con-
firmatory research. Researchers complying with such a plan would decide in advance
on primary and secondary outcome variables, measurement scales, statistical tests,
covariates, and so on, as to minimize the potential for p-hacking. However, Olken’s
judgment is mixed: while such plans may be both efficient and feasible for controlled
trials in psychology or medicine, econometric data analysis typically deals with com-
plex datasets, a high number of secondary outcome variables, and aims at unraveling
hidden theoretical mechanisms. The tradeoff between unbiasedness, efficiency and nu-
ance implied by compulsory preregistration may be non-trivial in economics. Finally,
the Registered Reports model, where the publication of an article is decided on the
basis of the research question (e.g., Chambers, 2013), the experimental design and the
data analysis plan, may helpful to counter the file drawer effect and publication bias
for disciplines where simply structured controlled trials are the norm (e.g., medicine,
psychology). However, it is is not easily transferable to the type of (observational)
data analysis that economists typically undertake.
Compared to economists, psychologists worry more about flawed incentives in their
discipline and the shortcomings of significance tests (e.g., Bakker et al., 2012; Cum-
ming, 2012; Schmidt, 1996). They have a tradition of critical reflection on NHST and
relating it to philosophical questions that is almost absent in economics (e.g., Cohen,
1994; Meehl, 1967). However, also in psychology, the scathing criticisms of significance
tests have not led to an abolition of that practice, even if significance levels are now
routinely accompanied by standard errors and effect size estimates. Where does this
inertia come from? Why does the persuasive force of pro-reform arguments not result
in real change? Martin Altman (2004) and Bruce Thompson (2004) identify various
sources, which may also play a role in economics. The problem is—like in politics—not
a lack of awareness or knowledge distribution, but a lack of willingness to implement
them at anything faster than an excruciatingly low pace, if at all. Barriers to change
may be the time delay caused by the bureaucratic constraints on procedures within
large professional associations such as the AEA and the APA, fear of the cognitive dis-
sonance that would result from giving up a practice that one has followed for ages, and
lack of commitment on behalf of key figures such as senior practitioners and editors-
in-chief of major journals who could “force” authors to abide by more sophisticated
procedures. We are curious whether the sense of urgency created by the replication
crisis and the evidence of p-hacking and publication crisis leads to genuine method-
ological reform and to more sustainable statistical practice.
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6. Conclusion
Significance testing in economics has been hotly contested from its very beginnings.
However, the focal points of the criticism have shifted. Early criticisms, like the ones
found in the Tinbergen-Keynes-Friedman debate, sustained that the assumptions of
significance tests are seldom, if ever, met for economic data. While unrealistic assump-
tions are common in economic modeling, they invalidate significance tests, according
to critics, when they are the crucial nexus between the tested theoretical model and
the data.
These criticisms did not prevent significance testing from becoming an highly
influential and widespread tool in economics, and econometrics in particular. And
widespread use came with frequent misuse, especially when p-values became standard
measures of statistical evidence. Critics like Ziliak and McCloskey object that statis-
tical significance levels are no good indicators of actual relevance for economic policy
decisions (because the p-value is by itself not an indicator of effect size). According to
ZMC, this confusion has created a lot of damage to economic science and society as a
whole. Recently, the debate about significance testing has got a new twist due to in-
creasing evidence of p-hacking and questionable research practices, and doubts about
the replicability and trustworthiness of research findings. These phenomena were first
identified in other sciences such as psychology and medicine, but they are a problem
for economics, too.
Responses to these challenges are grouped into three categories (e.g., Romero, 2019):
(1) statistical reform, such as use of confidence intervals and Bayesian models, (2)
methodological reform, such as pre-registration of experiments and data analysis plans,
and (3) social reform, such as setting up crediting researchers also with confirmatory
research and non-significant findings. Which combination of these three approaches is
the best reply to save the reliability of significance testing in economics is an exciting
question for future research.
References
Altman, M. (2004). Statistical significance, path dependency, and the culture of journal pub-
lication. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 33(5):651 – 663.
Bakker, M., Wicherts, J., and van Dijk, A. (2012). The Rules of the Game Called Psychological
Science. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7:543–554.
Berg, N. (2004). No-decision classification: an alternative to testing for statistical significance.
The Journal of Socio-Economics, 33(5):631 – 650.
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